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This paper investigates the determinants of employment vulnerability among private sector workers and assesses it effects on 
private sector household income in Cameroon. To address these objectives, use is made of multiple correspondence and the 
IV econometric analyses. Econometric results indicate that the density of formal institutions is negatively and significantly 
associated with employment vulnerability. Equally, more educated and skilled workers are less likely to be vulnerable in 
employment. Results show that employment vulnerability generally correlates inversely with private sector income. We found 
evidence of compensation for managerial and supervisory duties in the private sector. Other correlates like years of 
schooling, cumulated labour market experience and access to microcredit are important in determining private sector 
household income, slightly more so in the informal and farming sectors than other sectors.  
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I. Introduction 
Over the past 25 plus years, labour markets in Cameroon and other developing countries have been 
experiencing marked changes in response to important social and economic forces. Since the advent of 
the crisis of the 1980s, the image of the household with a single earner, most often the male, working 
full-time in a permanent job with one employer has been replaced by a combination of two earners, 
with many working part-time or in temporary employment. Some employed household heads have 
even gone further to combine two jobs in order to keep and maintain their families. Most of the 
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retrenched public sector workers as a result of the structural adjustment programme (SAP)
1
 embraced 
private sector farm, nonfarm, formal and informal activities to cope with these shocks and to maintain 
their households. The private sector is represented here as a last resort in times of crisis and major 
economic shocks. Unfortunately, this is the sector where unsteady income schemes, social insecurity, 
job dissatisfaction, job instability and other characteristics of indecent or vulnerable employment are 
likely more apparent. Studies on the causes and consequences of these rather unfavourable working 
conditions are still rare.  
 
In the Cameroon labour market, household heads working in the private sector are more vulnerable in 
their jobs than those in the public sector. This situation is of major concern, especially the puzzle on 
how this adverse situation of employment vulnerability in the private sector affects the labour 
outcomes (say monthly income) of those therein. It is equally worthy to mention that employment 
vulnerability intensity does not level-up across private sector employment segments. For instance, 
workers in the informal and farm employment sectors are more vulnerable compared to those in the 
formal-private and nonfarm-private sectors, respectively. Thus, more workers in formal-private and 
nonfarm-private employment sectors have decent employment status compared to their informal and 
farm sector counterparts. These summarised examples are indications that the participation of these 
vulnerable categories of workers in the labour market leaves their well-being at risk.  
 
Recent attention along these lines is focused on assessing vulnerable employment and showing how it 
associates with major economic outcomes (ILO, 2007). There is also growing consensus that job 
instability, an aspect of vulnerability, is central among poor workers and is a leading cause and 
expression of poverty (World Bank, 2000). Current empirical endeavours in Cameroon even indicate 
that employees holding fixed term contracts are twice more productive than those holding indefinite-
term contract (Fomba, 2008; 2011). Other country-based endeavours have investigated the influence 
of trade union membership on income or salary (Tsafack, 2000). All these evidences show that 
employment status is associated with major economic outcomes. This chapter takes a broader view of 
this association; it combines institutional variables (employment contracts; compliance with the labour 
code in terms of social security, vacation, hours work); time-related factors (casual and unstable 
employment); job satisfaction; remuneration stability; union membership; and job-related fringe 
benefits in the form of an index to check this association. Importantly, Cameroon in her most recent 
Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) has placed growth and decent employment at the 
centre of poverty reduction. In order to provide inputs into the GESP and to assist the government in 
her struggle against vulnerable employment and poverty, this chapter addresses the main question of: 
What is the role of employment vulnerability among other determinants of private sector household 
income in Cameroon? 
Studies on the association of vulnerable employment and economic outcomes like income are just 
beginning to evolve. In the developed countries, it has been observed that physically hazardous and 
highly strenuous jobs are often better paid than less strenuous or hazardous jobs (see Poggi, 2007; 
Fernandez and Nordman, 2009). Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the theory of compensating 
wage differentials
2
 is completely absent at country-specific levels in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
Bocquier et al. (2010) use data from the 1-2-3 surveys collected in 2002-2003 to carry-out a cross 
                                                             
1 The putting in place of the SAP involved: liquidating non-profit making and privatising some marginal profit making public enterprises; reducing public expenditure; 
freezing salary increment of the public sector workers; decreasing public and semi public sector workers from early 1990 and implementing salary cuts in January and 
November 1993 (Baye, 2006a). 
 
2 Smith (1776) identified five circumstances to explain why it is not the wage that is the balancing factor among 
different jobs on a competitive market, but all the pros and cons of a job. 
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country comparison for seven economic capitals
3
 of West Africa. The work of Bocquier et al. (2010), 
while filling gaps in the SSA empirical literature on employment vulnerability, has two major 
weaknesses: (1) the study draws data from the 1-2-3 surveys which only capture issues in economic 
capital cities, hence not suitable for nationwide policies; and (2) it uses only variables and sectors 
which are similar in the 7 cities under review. In an effort to circumvent these weaknesses, the 
following specific research questions would be addressed in this study: 
 What are the major determinants of private sector employment vulnerability? 
 What is the role of employment vulnerability among the determinants of private sector 
household income in Cameroon?  
 What is the effect of employment vulnerability on household income across employment sectors 
in Cameroon? 
 
Using the 2007 CHCS-III which covers vital labour market indicators, the main objective of this 
chapter is to identify the major determinants of private sector household income in Cameroon, overall 
and by employment sectors. The specific objectives are: 
 To assess the determinants of private sector employment vulnerability; 
 To evaluate the effect of employment vulnerability on private sector household income, while 
testing the theory of compensating wage differentials; 
  To examine the differential effects of employment vulnerability on income by sector of 
employment (formal/informal and farm/nonfarm). This will also allow us to track elements of 
segmentation across formal/informal and farm/nonfarm with respect to vulnerability; and 
 To identify policy orientations on the basis of the study. 
 
These objectives will allow our analysis to check whether vulnerability has a differential effect on 




II. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
Literature Review  
Literature on traditional models, within the competitive framework, underline the existence of 
compensating payments due to non-pecuniary job attributes like working conditions or differences in 
the stability of jobs across industries. It is important to recall that the idea of equalizing or 
compensating wage differentials was first introduced by Smith (1776, Book I, Chapter X, Part I). 
Growing empirical literature on the evidence of this idea, compensating wage differentials, only found 
strength in the 1970s. Early studies on the internal wage policies of firms acknowledged the presence 
of equalizing differences (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, p. 66-68 and Reynolds, 1974, p. 210). 
A line of reflection focused on working conditions and job-related risks to brighten this idea. Lucas 
(1972) found evidence of significant compensation for repetitive work and somewhat smaller 
compensation for jobs with adverse working conditions (hazards and extreme temperature). For him, 
jobs requiring physical strength appeared to command lower wages (p. 554-55). In the contrary, 
Bluestone (1974), Quin (1975), and Hamermesh (1977) all found no evidence of wage compensation 
for jobs requiring physical strength (hazards or extreme temperature). This is clear evidence of 
                                                             
3 Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey, and Ouagadougou 
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conflicting results on this subject in the literature. Smith (1973) concluded that the probability of job-
related fatal injuries (or job-related death) may be fully reflected in wage rates. 
Another stream of studies have emphasised on the fact that individuals may choose more flexible and 
easier jobs at the cost of lower wages. Lazaar (1977) observed significantly lower wages for young 
men enrolled in school. He argued that this observation is consistent with an equalizing-difference 
explanation which holds that students optimally prefer more flexible and easier jobs at the cost of 
lower wages. Though, with little empirical support, human capital theorists maintain that individuals 
gain entry into occupations with prospects of higher future wages only by accepting lower current 
wages (Mincer, 1974b, p. 58-59). Schiller and Weiss (1977) examined the nexus between pension 
benefits and wages in a sample of firm workers and found evidence of equalizing-difference 
hypothesis among younger workers but not among those nearing retirement. These studies highlight 
the need to check the possibility of compensating differentials across sub-groups or employment 
sectors within the labour market. 
Other studies have focused on hours of work flexibility, working conditions, and employment and 
income stability to address the theory of compensating wage differentials. Duncan (1976) found 
substantial compensating differentials for some job characteristics (freedom to control hours worked, 
employment and income stability, and safe working conditions). In the same light, Duncan and 
Stafford (1977) reported positive premiums for work effort and for jobs that restrict “opportunities to 
choose an individual work schedule and work pace”. However, the premiums become statistically 
insignificant when a theoretically preferable wage measure is employed. It is worthy to mention that 
up to this level, the empirical relationship between wages and other fringe benefits (like vacations, 
health insurance or job allowances) is still scarce.   
A branch of the literature stresses on adverse working conditions from a broader perspective, 
including physical demands, noise, or dirtiness, by using hedonic wage equations (see for example 
Brown 1980). In recent research, for example, job stress (French and Dunlap, 1998), flexible working 
hours (Gariety and Shaffer, 2001), shift work (Lanfranchi et al., 2002), and perception of job 
instability, measured by product market volatility (Magnani, 2002), among other factors, have been 
investigated. Most of these studies suffered the problem of omitted-variable bias, and the coefficients 
of various adverse job characteristics were often wrongly-signed and insignificant in the wage 
equations (Bockerman et al., 2004). Bockerman et al. (2004), on their part, investigate the role of 
adverse working conditions in the determination of individual wages and overall job satisfaction in the 
labour market. Their results show that working conditions have a very minor role in the determination 
of individual wages in the labour market. In contrast, adverse working conditions substantially 
increase the level of job dissatisfaction and the perception of unfairness of pay at the workplace. 
Another generation uses some industry-level variables to counteract the evidence of compensating-
difference, stressing the importance of non-competitive dimensions of wage formation. In this 
perspective, Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) stress that the non-competitive aspects of wage formation 
are very important in terms of compensating wage differentials. Their estimated wage equation 
included a number of industry-level controls (such as profitability and capital/labour ratio) or, 
alternatively, a full set of dummies attached to industries. They found that the inclusion of industry-
level controls largely wipes out the compensating wage differentials that have been observed in the 
literature. This pattern is consistent with the dominance of non-competitive wage formation in the 
labour market. Hwang et al. (1998) and Lang and Majumdar (2003) also acknowledge that working 
conditions may not be reflected in wages. Notwithstanding, it is important to recall that equilibrium 
distribution of wage and job characteristic combinations may not show evidence of compensating 
wage differentials. 
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Recent endeavours to investigate the theory of compensating wage differentials attempt to combine the 
characteristics of the workers with those of their jobs in the form of an index or indicator before 
studying the evidence of compensating-difference. The work of Fernandez and Nordman (2009), use 
individual job characteristics to construct the composite index of vulnerability and study its link with 
income. Like Poggi (2007), Fernandez and Nordman (2009) observe that, in developed countries, 
physically hazardous and highly strenuous jobs are often better paid than less strenuous or hazardous 
jobs.  
Following from Cheli and Lemmi (1995) and Fernandez and Nordman (2009), Bocquier et al. (2010) 
construct the private sector employment vulnerability index and establish its links with monthly 
income in seven economic capitals of West Africa. Bocquier et al. (2010) find that the average impact 
of vulnerability on income is generally negative for an average level of vulnerability. In the formal 
private sector of the West African cities, losses of income due to vulnerability are lower for high levels 
of vulnerability, but do not translate into gains. In the informal sector, however, the average predicted 
income for a high vulnerability level is higher than the average predicted income for a low 
vulnerability level. This way, the assumption that average gains may compensate for a certain level of 
vulnerability is thus confirmed in the informal sector. 
 
However, the work of Bocquier et al. (2010), though vital in the SSA empirical literature on 
employment vulnerability, draws data from the 1-2-3 surveys which only capture concerns in 
economic capital cities, hence not suitable for broad-based policies; and uses only variables and 
sectors which are similar in the seven cities under review, as intimated earlier. Empirical knowledge 
on the employment vulnerability at the country-level in SSA is still unravelled. As value added, our 
study uses the 2007 Cameroon household consumption survey (CHCS-III), to account for some 
additional variables (paid leaves, and housing allowances) in constructing the vulnerability index and 




Our interpretation of the link between employment vulnerability and household income draws on the 
theory of compensating wage differentials. There is a stretched history of economic research into the 
mechanisms or models that narrow or widen wage differentials between individuals. The first 
generation of such models focused on competitive markets where they found wage premiums 
compensating non-pecuniary job attributes, such as working conditions, and differences in job stability 
across industries (Brown, 1980; Rosen, 1086; Murphy and Topel, 1987).  Most of these authors argue 
that when job characteristics (other than wages) enter into players’ labour market decisions (firms and 
workers); the market balance is thus due to the equalisation of workers’ utilities rather than their 
wages. Rosen (1986) speculates that the reckoning behind this is to be found in a simple supply and 
demand structure. On the one hand, labour supply decisions are based on a trade-off between earned 
income (wages) and the cost of doing the job (stress, repetition, production deadlines, etc.) such that, 
at optimum, wage differences correspond to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
and working conditions
4
. On the other hand, labour demand decisions by firms are based on a trade-off 
between the necessity of paying the workers compensation commensurate with the strenuous or 
hazardous nature of their tasks and the need to improve the working conditions offered. 
 
In this perspective, under the hypothesis of homogeneous individuals and heterogeneous work 
environments, wages differ between workers such that they all obtain the same utility. To encourage 
                                                             
4 Suppose we have the utility U(C, A), where C is the worker’s consumption and A adverse working conditions, 
the worker maximises her utility under constraint C= W(A), implying that W’(A)=UA/UC. 
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workers to accept more adverse working conditions, firms therefore have to offer higher wages. This is 
the central idea behind the theory of compensating wage differentials. Bootlegging the hypothesis of 
homogeneous individuals necessarily introduces a great deal of uncertainty as to the existence of 
compensation for working conditions when it is observed at the midpoint of the worker distribution. 
There could be need to divide the population observed into more homogeneous groups, for instance by 
using a conditional wage quantile derived from quantile regressions or employment sectors, so as to 
reduce the noise created by the presence of individual heterogeneity in the estimation of the 
compensating differential. More lately, non-competitive theories have argued that wage differences 
between apparently identical individuals tend more to reflect non-compensating differentials, such as 
the workers’ relative bargaining power (Daniel and Sofer, 1998; Manning, 2003) and the existence of 
efficiency wages
5
 (employer's wish to pay workers at a higher rate than the one that would prevail over 
a competitive market). Other recent hypotheses have highlighted the existence of information 
asymmetries, which allegedly increase the friction in the labour supply-demand match (Hwang et al., 
1998), and the existence of factor productivity differences between firms (Burdett and Mortensen, 
1998; Pissarides, 2000; Mortensen, 2003). 
Some empirical studies have spotlighted the relationship between wage structure and non-monetary 
job satisfaction, but most of these studies often generate conflicting results (for example, French and 
Dunlap, 1998; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 1998;  Lanfranchi et al., 2002;  Magnani, 2002; 
Clark and Senik, 2006; Bockerman et  al., 2006;  and Poggi,  2007). Research into the nexus between 
compensating differentials and observed job attributes, especially when it entails distributional 
approaches is still just evolving. In a recent study of this kind, Fernandez and Nordman (2009) observe 
that the compensating differential actually differs depending on the worker’s relative position in the 
income distribution. For example, pecuniary compensation for adverse working conditions could well 
be overestimated if the most capable (or resistant) workers are selected for employment statuses where 
these attributes are more commonplace.  
 
Moreover, basing on the assumption that the most capable individuals are also the most likely to 
receive efficiency wages, or to have a certain amount of bargaining power, working conditions could 
well have less to do with the wage-setting process for these individuals than for other workers without 
these characteristics. By and large, workers could also find it easier to ask for premiums for adverse 
working conditions when the demand for labour exceeds the available manpower, creating a labour 
market imbalance that probably varies along the income distribution. Our work focuses on the issue of 
employment vulnerability found, for example, in insecure employment contracts, adverse working 
conditions and, more broadly, greater worker exposure to work-related risks. After investigating the 
determinants of employment vulnerability, we employ a quantitative approach addressing the effects 
of vulnerability on household income, while controlling for other correlates. Thereafter, we use a 
distributional approach checking whether there are any compensating differential phenomena found 
along farm-nonfarm and formal-informal employment sectors.  
 
 
III. Methodology  
 
Concerning the construction of the employment vulnerability indicator, see Appendix 2 for a 
description of the approach and initial variables used. Our interpretation of the link between 
employment vulnerability and income raises a number of econometric issues that our study attempts to 
                                                             
5 For a review of the efficiency wage theories and its extension (see Katz, 1986  and Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). 
See Lindbeck and Snower (1989) for a review of insider outsider models (labour market segmentation theory). 
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address. There exists a likelihood of employment vulnerability being endogenous in the income 
equation. Our study then employs the instrumental variable approach (Wooldridge, 1997; Mwabu, 
2009) to investigate the effect of employment vulnerability on income across employment sectors in 
Cameroon.  
To quantify the effect of vulnerability on household income, what matters to us is the cumulative 
number of vulnerability criteria fulfilled by an individual rather than such or such a criterion. This 
way, the effect of vulnerability (I) on income can be written as follows: 
         1  IXY y                                                                                      (1) 
where: Y is the log of household per capita income per month; I  is the vulnerability intensity; X 
represents a vector of the human capital variables and other correlates (potential labour market 
experience
6
 and its square, control for gender-dummy, microcredit access, number of younger 
children, being married, seniority in the enterprise and control for urban residency);   is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated including the constant term; and 1  the error term. Our analysis has as 
objective to estimate the effect of employment vulnerability    on income overall and across sub-
sectors in Cameroon. For example, formal-private as opposed to the informal sector and farm as 




There is a probability of vulnerability being endogenous as unobservable variables may be associated 
with vulnerability and household income. More generally, unobservable variables that affect the level 
of vulnerability and the level of income may reflect the worker’s bargaining capacities and the 
worker’s household situation. Specifically, a worker who has no bargaining power, who is shy or has 
no social interactions, is likely to be unable to negotiate either good working conditions or wage rise. 
Equally, if a worker’s household is insecure or if a worker’s household is hit by a shock (illness or 
birth or unemployment), the worker may have to hastily accept a poorly-paid job, if she lacks social 
networks to respond to this household shock. In this respect, ignoring this factor in our equation may 
leave us with non-convergent estimators of   . We employ therefore the IV method to resolve this 
problem (see Card, 2001, Mwabu, 2009 and Bocquier et al., 2010).  
 
The IV method involves the use of a vector of instrumental variables, Z , which explain vulnerability 
intensity and are not directly correlated with household income or 1 , the error term in equation (1). 
Our instruments are regional density of formal governmental institutions and attachment to traditional 
believes captured at cluster level.
8
 These instruments chosen to better suit the country context have no 
direct impact on income as they are not associated with the worker’s productivity, capacities or the 
type of job held except through employment vulnerability itself. Thus, the reduced-form equation is 
given by: 
                  2  II ZXI                                                                                             (2) 
                                                             
6 Potential labour market experience = Age – minus schooling – minus six (job tenure in years). 
7 In the literature, labour market segmentation is usefully stylized by what is called labour market dualism (see Dixit, 1973).  
One sector is alternatively called “formal”, “modern”, “good jobs”, or “urban” while the other part is alternatively called 
“informal”, “traditional”, “bad jobs”, or “rural”. 
8 The literature uses the marital status of the household head and the dummy variable for the institutional sector (formal 
private, informal private or unknown) of the individual’s father (see Fernandez and Nordman, 2009 and Bocquier et al., 
2010). 
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Where,    and  are vectors of the parameters to be estimated and 2  the error term. Equation (2) 
will allow us to identify the determinants of employment vulnerability among private sector workers. 
 
IV. Data used and Instruments of the Composite Indicator of Vulnerability  
4.1. Data presentation and justification of the measure of income 
Data presentation 
We employ the Cameroon household consumption surveys, CHCS III conducted in 2007 by the 
National Institute of Statistics (NIS), which provides information on labour market employment 
sectors and labour market characteristics relevant for the study. The CHCS III survey was conducted 
between May and July 2007; and comprised 11391 households that were actually interviewed with 
9219 of these household heads in the private sector and about 1102 of them in public/parapublic and 
international organisations. It is important to recall that 165 of these household heads are unemployed 
according to the international labour office, 93 are discouraged unemployed and 812 are inactive in the 
labour market.  
 
The dependent variable for our study is per capita monthly income, surrogated by per capita 
expenditures per month. The potential endogenous variable is employment vulnerability indicator
9
.  
Exogenous included variables are education (years); experience (years of work) and its square; 
seniority in the main job (dummy); number of younger children (cluster level); number of married 
household heads (cluster level), gender (dummy); and location (dummy). Instruments of endogenous 
input are: density of institutions per region and attachment to traditional believes (cluster level). The 
density of regional institutions is extracted from the Presidential Decree N°2008/376 of November 
2008 based on Administrative Organisation in Cameroon
10
. Other variables: sector of employment 
(farm/nonfarm, and formal/informal). 
 
Justification of the Income Measure 
This role of income can be interpreted in more than one way. If one has in mind spending power then 
perhaps disposable income (income after taxes and compulsory deductions) may be an appropriate 
concept. The focus on income as conventionally defined clearly has shortcomings, as it is hard to get 
reliable data on income (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). According to Blundell and Preston (1998) 
consumption expenditure may be a more appropriate economic indicator of income. For them, use of 
consumption data can avoid a number of difficult technical problems that arise from the presence in 
practice of zero and negative incomes.  
 
Ravallion (1994) underlines that expenditure is less inclined to vary with fluctuations than income. 
This view makes expenditure particularly suitable in developing and agricultural economies where the 
informal sector is considerable and agricultural activities, subject to seasonal variations, are 
predominant. Consolidating this observation, Deaton (2009) emphasises that expenditure data is better 
measured than income in developing countries and agrarian economies; as income for rural 
households may fluctuate within the year in line with the harvest cycle, in urban economies with large 
informal sector as well; income flows may be inconsistent. Thus, it may be quite difficult for 
households to provide meaningful information on their income. In this perspective, information on 
income in most surveys in developing countries is likely to be of low quality. In this context, 
expenditure is likely a closer proxy to the current income of a household. Moreover, for Thorbecke 
(2005) and Klasen (2008) it is easy to obtain information on the income of the earner(s) in a 
household, but it is not easy to know how this income is later on distributed within the household. 
Generally, this problem is solved by assuming a unitary distribution of income within the household. 
                                                             
9
 See Appendix for the construction of the employment vulnerability indicator. 
10 See appendix for the density of institutions per region.  
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Thus, justifying our use of expenditure per capita as a proxy of per capita income; given by household 
total expenditure divided by household size. 
 
This proxy may particularly suit the context of developing countries like Cameroon, as individuals and 
households hardly answer survey questions relative to their income. They hide their monthly, weekly 
or daily income for reasons still unknown to us. This way, the income columns of surveys in most 
developing countries are plagued with many missing values rendering them unrepresentative. For 
instance out of the 11391 households interviewed in the 2007 Cameroon household consumption 
survey, CHCS III, only about 6700 household heads provided information on their income, leaving us 
with about 4600 missing values. Thus, in this study household per capita income is surrogated by 
household per capita expenditure.  
4.2. Justifications of the Instruments of Vulnerability 
Institutions and Vulnerability 
In almost every country today, governments have an unquestionable responsibility in ensuring decent 
working conditions among individuals and households therein. Vulnerability is related to the risks, 
shocks, and stresses to which a household head is subjected and the state of being defenceless or the 
lack of means to cope with these risks, shocks, stresses, or demands (Pagés, 2003; p.9). The sources of 
these risks, among other things, may include institutions governing resource access and contract 
enforcement, working conditions, together with labour and commodity markets as a whole. We argue 
that the regional spread of administrative institutions and institutional change may help household 
heads in their efforts to attain decent employment status. Almost every household in Cameroon would 
be capable of developing better working conditions if the regional institutions implement policies and 
programmes related to contract enforcement, minimum wages, social security and other decent work 
facets.  
 
The government and her regional institutions have, as duty, to encourage a general attitude in the 
population about the quality of work and favourable working conditions. The formal institutions, 
found in each sub-division, range from civil and municipal administrations, law and order, to 
ministerial delegations. Each sub-division in Cameroon is generally endowed with these institutions; 
the more there are sub-divisions in a region, the higher the institutional coverage in this region. Thus, 
we consider the number of sub-divisions in a region to capture its institutional coverage. The regional 
delegation for labour and social security and employment and professional training coordinate and 
promote regional employment. These regional delegations should create the necessary conditions so 
that working household heads and employment agencies can function smoothly. For North (1990), 
institutions are ‘the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. He refers to the rules governing property rights, businesses, 
employment, churches and schools. Ostrom et al. (1993) support this, by stating that institutions are 
the people and the patterns of regular, repetitive interactions among them that transform inputs into 
outputs. Also note that informal institutional settings that include social norms, routines, and political 
processes can determine working conditions of people. Thus institutions should interact between 
employers and employees to encourage favourable working conditions. We therefore use the density 
of formal regional institutions in Cameroon to instrument for employment vulnerability. We expect the 
density of institution to correlate inversely with employment vulnerability.  
 
Traditional Attachment and Vulnerability 
The question of the linkage between traditional attachment and vulnerability in employment may 
appear new. However, attachment to traditional believes, given its practice in Africa, is probably a 
non-negligible factor of social and economic interactions. We argue that attachment to traditional 
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doctrine affects a household head’s bargaining power and his socio-economic interactions negatively. 
Thus, the latter, relatively absent from modern social classes as compared to Protestants, Christians 
and Muslims lacks the social networks and ability to deal with household shocks (unemployment, 
birth or illness). Such a household head may have to accept, in the event of a household shock, a 
poorly-paid or a job with adverse working conditions, just because she lacks social networks to 
respond to this household shock.  It is also vital to highlight that this phenomenon is generally 
inherited, because it is past down from generations to generations involving little or no choice on the 
part of the traditionalists; though it can be argued that it is one’s choice to remain a traditionalist. 
 
Weber (1930) argues that Protestant doctrines, for instance Calvin’s doctrine of predestination provide 
the theological motivation for capitalistic activities. According to him, strict Protestant asceticism or 
Catholic monasticism which these churches naturally imposed, especially on the property less classes, 
affects the productivity of labour in the capitalistic sense of the word. This is indication that strict 
doctrines that churches and traditions practice may undoubtedly affect a household head’s decision 
and determination at work as well as her ability to negotiate wage rise and working conditions. 
Audretsch et al. (2007), further confirms this, by arguing that religion affects an individual’s decision 
making habit. Given the possible correlation of traditional attachment with our outcome variable, 
income, we capture it at cluster level to instrument for vulnerability. We expect traditional attachment 
to correlate positively with employment vulnerability. 
 
V. Empirical Findings and Interpretations 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Reduced-form Estimates of Vulnerability 
Here we carry out some descriptive discussions on the variables employed in this chapter and present 
the predictors of employment vulnerability. These discussions will help enhance our interpretations 
and allow us generate study-specific conclusions. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 hosts summary statistics describing the variables used in the empirical analysis. On average, a 
household head in the private sector earns about 21 500 CFA francs per month. This average monthly 
income is well below the minimum wage of 28 500 CFA francs per month in Cameroon. Most of the 
households in our sample are headed by men and majority are rural dwellers. More than 79% of 
households are headed by men as opposed to about 21% headed by women. Close to 30% of private 
sector households live in urban areas whereas 70% are in rural areas. On the averagely, there are more 
vulnerable household heads in the private sector compared to the public sector. This vulnerability 
differential between the above employment sectors is enough ground for further questioning of how 
these private sector household heads may be affected by this rather adverse situation. Very few private 
sector workers hold managerial positions and just a small minority of private sector operators have 
access to microfinance credit. Only about 8% of the household heads interviewed are holding 
managerial positions in private enterprises and only about 6% of private sector household heads in a 
cluster benefit access to microcredit. 
Averagely, a private sector household head has acquired 6 (six) years of education, so majority have 
only completed primary school. According to the Government of Cameroon (2007), about 33.3% of 
these private sector operators have no education, 37.4% have completed primary education, 26.3% 
have reached the secondary school level and only 3% have reached the university. About 63% of 
household heads in each cluster are married and on average household heads in a cluster have 2 (two) 
children. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
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Outcome variables    
Log of household capita  monthly income 9219 10.17 0.64 
Household per capita  monthly income 9219 21 500 20357.37 
Potential endogenous variable    
Employment Vulnerability Intensity (0 - 100) 9219 87.90 15.35 
Exogenous included Variables    
Labour experience (years of work) 9219 32.93 13.95 
Labour experience squared 9219 1278.82 1066.06 
Years of  Education 9219 5.37 4.68 
Seniority in the enterprise (dummy for managerial position) 9219 0.08 0.27 
Access to microcredit (cluster level) 9219 0.06 0.09 
Number of younger children (cluster level) 9219 1.18 1.33 
Number of married household heads (cluster level) 9219 0.63 0.21 
Gender of household head (male = 1) 9219 0.80 0.40 
Location of household head (urban = 1) 9219 0.30 0.46 
Instruments of endogenous variable     
Density of institutions   (per region) 9219 0.50 0.32 
Attachment to traditional beliefs (cluster level) 9219 0.04 0.08 
Controls variables    
Predicted vulnerability residual 9219 -0.09 x 10-7 13.82 
Other variables     
Formal private employment sector  (formal  = 1) 9219 0.08 0.26 
Informal employment sector  (informal  = 1) 9219 0.92 0.26 
Nonfarm private employment sector (nonfarm = 1) 9219 0.543 0.48 
Farm private employment sector (farm = 1) 9219 0.457 0.48 
Source: Compiled by author from the 2007 Cameroon Household survey (ECAM III) 
 
On the average, each region in Cameroon has about 50% of institutional coverage. Most private sector 
household heads are in the informal sector followed by the farming sector. Close to 92.5% of private 
sector household heads are in informal employment as opposed to 7.5% in the formal employment 
sector. Close to 46% of these household heads depend on farm activities (small scale farms, 
plantations, fruit firms and animal rearing) compared to about 54% in nonfarm activities (own-account 
businesses, housekeeping, banking, as well as associative enterprises like cooperatives, NGOs, 
syndicates). 
The Reduced-form Estimates of Vulnerability – Determinants of employment vulnerability 
Excluded Variables versus Employment Vulnerability 
The employment vulnerability indicator ranges from 0 to 100 and a progression towards 100 depicts 
increasing vulnerability. Table 2 submits the reduced-form estimates of the endogenous variable, 
employment vulnerability (equation 2). The density of institutions which represents the institutional 
coverage in each region is negatively and significantly associated with employment vulnerability. This 
implies that decision making to reduce vulnerable employment among private sector workers in 
Cameroon should also be seen from the angle of institutional coverage by region. Regional institutions 
(civil and municipal administrations, law and order, ministerial delegations, and trade unions) can play 
a vital role in encouraging a general attitude among private sector workers about the quality of work 
and favourable working conditions. Regional delegations of labour and social security as well as 
employment and professional training are crucial inputs in promoting quality employment among 
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private sector workers at the regional level, that is, assist in building and guarantying a win-win 
interaction between the private sector employer and the employee. 
 
 Moreover, civil society organisations, trade unions and employers can improve their own efforts to 
reduce vulnerable employment. Trade union strategies for increasing membership amongst vulnerable 
workers, assessing the current availability of employment advice provision, and considering how good 
employers can better share practice and promote change with and amongst others are to be 
encouraged.  This sense of judgment corroborates that which is underlined in North (1990) on the role 
of institutions. 
 
The average number of workers who are attached to traditional believes and doctrines captured as 
cluster level means, is positive and significant in determining employment vulnerability. This is 
indication that traditional attachment adversely affects a worker’s social and economic interactions, 
limiting the individual’s ability to deal with household and economic shocks like unemployment, birth 
and illness; exposing the latter to greater chances of accepting a vulnerable job in order to cope with 
these shocks. This observation is probable, as workers who are attached to traditional believes are 
likely to be absent from modern and decision making classes in the society. 
 
 
Table 2: Determinants of Employment Vulnerability  
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable t-values 
 
Employment vulnerability intensity:  
ranges from 0 – 100 for household heads 
actively employed in the private sector and 
missing if household head is unemployed, 
discouraged unemployed or inactive  
 
Density of institutions   (per region) -2.951*** (-6.31) 
Attachment to traditional beliefs (cluster level) 13.405*** (7.41) 
Labour experience -0.197*** (-4.47) 
Labour experience squared 0.003*** (4.36) 
Years of education -0.873*** (-21.85) 
Seniority in the enterprise -5.036*** (-9.09) 
Access to microcredit (cluster level) -0.106 (-0.07) 
Number of younger children (cluster level) 0.279** (2.44) 
Number of married household heads (cluster level) 2.927*** (3.61) 
Gender of household head (male = 1) -2.948*** (-7.78) 
Location of household head (urban = 1) -6.095*** (-17.37) 
Constant 100.486*** (96.67) 
   
R-squared 0.1896 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1887 
 
Partial R-squared (on excluded instruments) 0.0108 
 




Source: Computed by author using ECAM III 
Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
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Included Variables versus Employment Vulnerability 
Included variables in the outcome equation that are positively associated with employment 
vulnerability are: labour experience square, the cluster mean of number of children less than 5 (five) 
years, and the cluster mean of number of married household heads. Contrary to labour experience 
square, labour experience of worker is negatively and significantly correlated with employment 
vulnerability. This indicates that though work experience correlates negatively with employment 
vulnerability, there is a critical level of labour experience above which it starts correlating positively 
with employment vulnerability; this may reflect experience beyond retirement. This is also indication 
of a U-shaped relationship between work experience and employment vulnerability.  
 
Education in years is negatively related to employment vulnerability. Interestingly, this result shows 
that the more educated an individual is, the less likely is this individual to be vulnerable. These 
findings are supported by Imoro and King (2006) who found that inadequate participation in education 
and skills training expose people, especially the youths, to vulnerability in terms of employment. 
Educated workers are not only likely to access decent jobs in the labour market but can also bargain 
their wages and working conditions better than their uneducated counterparts. Private sector workers 
in the urban areas are generally less vulnerable as well as those who have access to microcredit. Thus, 
policies to promote access to microcredit among private sector workers in Cameroon have direct 
potentials to reduce vulnerable employment. 
 
Being male gender type is negatively and significantly related to vulnerability in the private sector. 
These is evident as most of the petit businesses or petit trading in the private sector, with no social 
cover, less security and apparent instability, are done by women. Thus, training and capacity building 
programmes to empower women and young girls are vital. Training in income generating activities, in 
the management of micro-financial institutions and capacity upgrading of those already in private 
employment is a way forward. This suggestion corroborates with the Government of Cameroon (2012, 
p. 97), where emphasis is placed on socio-economic development through advocacy, sensitization, 
support, capacity building and other forms of support programmes. 
 
Relevance, Strength and Validity of Instruments 
The first-stage F-statistic on excluded instruments of 41.09 (p-value 0.000) is evidence that the two 
instrumental variables are jointly significant (Table 2). Concerning the validity and strength of our 
instruments, the Sargan Chi2 test statistic of 3.028 (p-value 0.0819) casts no doubt on the validity of 
the instruments. While allowing for a 2SLS relative bias of ten per cent, the test statistics of 41.086 is 
far more than the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value of 19.93, implying that our instruments are 
not weak (Table 3 column 2). 
5.2. Determinants of Private Sector Household Income in Cameroon 
The primary objective of this section is to investigate the effect of employment vulnerability on 
private sector household income, while controlling for other correlates of private sector income. After 
considering the effects of employment vulnerability on the general sample of private sector workers, 
further checks for the differential effect of employment vulnerability are conducted by examining its 
effects across formal/informal and nonfarm/farm private employment sectors in Cameroon.  
5.2.1. Correlates of Private Sector Household Income under Alternative Assumptions: Full   Sample 
Table 3 hosts estimates of the income production function for the whole sample under different 
approaches or assumptions. Column (1) presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the 
structural parameters of Equation (1). The next column, column (2), submits the instrumental variable 
(IV) estimates of household income function.  
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In Table 3, employment vulnerability is negatively and significantly related to household per capita 
monthly income irrespective of the approach used. This result ties with Bocquier et al. (2010) who 
found that the average impact of vulnerability on income is generally negative in developing countries. 
It is also important to highlight that this result runs contrary to Poggi (2007) and Fernandez and 
Nordman (2009) who observed that, in developed countries, the effect of employment vulnerability on 
income is positive. According to Poggi (2007) and Fernandez and Nordman (2009), workers who 
accept adverse working conditions are often better paid. This type of situation is possible in developed 
countries where the labour is highly specialized, but in developing countries or in low income 
countries this situation is most likely to weigh negatively on labourers; with a highly unskilled and 
unspecialised labour force. Moreover, the opportunity cost of most unskilled labour in Cameroon is 
near zero.  
 
Table 3: Income Production Function: under Alternative Assumptions - Dependent Variable is 
log of Household Per Capita Monthly Income  










Employment vulnerability intensity -0.005*** -0.028*** 
 
(-13.4) (-6.03) 
Labour experience -0.013*** -0.018*** 
 
(-8.54) (-8.63) 
Labour experience squared 0.00016*** 0.0002*** 
 
(8.08) (8.28) 
Years of education 0.030*** 0.010** 
 
(20.7) (2.26) 
Seniority in the enterprise 0.298*** 0.184*** 
 
(15.3) (5.65) 
Access to microcredit (cluster level) 0.394*** 0.402*** 
 
(6.89) (5.87) 
Number of younger children (cluster level) -0.111*** -0.103*** 
 
(-27.3) (-20.40) 
Number of married household heads (cluster level) -0.299*** -0.235*** 
 
(-10.4) (-6.38) 
Gender of household head (male = 1) -0.053*** -0.121*** 
 
(-3.93) (-5.73) 
Location of household head (urban = 1) 0.417*** 0.272*** 
 
(33.0) (8.31) 
constant 10.44*** 12.776*** 
 
(203.0) (27.13) 
R-squared / Uncentred R-squared (for 2SLS) 0.4095 0.9963 
Partial R-squared (on excluded instruments)  0.0108 
Weak identification test: Cragg-Donald F-statistic [10% 
maximal IV relative bias] 
 41.086 [19.93] 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. Corr. LR statistic – 
Chi2 [df;p-value] 
 81.913 [2;0.0000] 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments) – 
Chi2[df;p-value] 
 3.028 [1;  0.0819] 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi2 test for exogeneity of the potential 
endogenous variable [df;p-value] 
 35.973 [1;0.0000] 
Number of observations 9219 9219 
Source: Computed by author using ECAM III 
Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  





 t-statistics in parentheses, except otherwise specified. 
 
 
The OLS estimate of the effect of employment vulnerability on income is -0.005. It is likely that 
workers with less social networks or low bargaining power are more vulnerable than those with 
enough social networks, and hence more likely to suffer the ill effects of vulnerability on income than 
others. In this perspective, observed household income may not only suffer from employment 
vulnerability but also from unobserved variables that affect employment vulnerability. The OLS 
predictions of the effect of vulnerability on household income are therefore biased and inconsistent. 
Checking for this potential endogeneity, the impact of employment vulnerability on income remains 
significantly negatively and the coefficient of employment vulnerability jumps to -0.028 (Table 3, 
column 2). This finding conforms to Bocquier et al. (2010) who affirmed that when endogeneity is 
accounted for, the impact of vulnerability on income remains negative, but is much greater in absolute 
terms. This is indication that the size and degree of the effect of employment vulnerability on per 
capita household monthly income depend on the estimation approach used. This observation further 
emphasises the need to use the estimation approach that internalises potential econometric problems to 
better inform public policy advice. In addition, the endogeneity test – the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi2 
stats = 35.973, p-value =0.0000 - for exogeneity of potential endogenous regressors rejects exogeneity 
of employment vulnerability (Table 3, column 2), confirming that this input into the outcome equation 
is indeed endogenous. 
 
In Table 3 column 2, work experience correlates negatively with household monthly income, whereas 
work experience square relates positively with household monthly income. This does not only indicate 
that household income improves with higher levels of work experience but more precisely that there is 
a critical level of work experience above which household income is enhanced. Better still, it depicts a 
U-shaped relationship between labour or work experience and household income. Though knowledge 
on this critical level of work experience is still at large, this is indication that more experienced 
workers earn more than the less experienced.  
 
Years of schooling relates positively with household income. This is not only because more educated 
workers are more likely to access opportunities in the labour market but also because they are more 
probable to operate with greater determination and dedication in the private sector. The finding 
corroborates with the predictions of the theory of human capital. It also ties with Kakwani et al. (2006, 
p. 29) who affirm that human capital acquired through education generally improves people’s income 
potential. In this perspective, income increases with the years of education, thus confirming the works 
on human capital (Mincer, 1974a) and those based on Cameroon data (Abessolo, 1997; Ajab-Amin 
and Awung, 2005 and Fomba, 2008), but contrasting the work of Tafah-Edokat (1998) on Cameroon. 
One may think of years of schooling here to be endogenous, which is not wrong. But our comfort is on 
the argument that these years of schooling were already acquired before the income generating 
decisions. This way, the process of income generation does not actually underlie years of schooling.   
Male gender type relates negatively with private sector income. Being male gender type does not 
reward labour in the private sector in Cameroon, but being a qualified or educated male can lead to 
gains in income.  Seniority (holding a managerial position which is also attributable to leadership 
skills) in the enterprise is positively related to household income. This evidence of compensations for 
managerial and supervisory duties may be rewarding responsibility at work. This is consistent with the 
general acknowledgment that there is a matching of individuals with high ability to positions with 
higher job complexity (Barron et al., 1999). This result is in tandem with our third hypothesis of work 
in this chapter. Equally, the introduction of this variable may be viewed as another way to venture or 
capture the effects of unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  





Urban residency is positive and significant in determining household income; thus urban residency can 
also help in enhancing household income. This is not necessarily due to the existence of relatively 
better jobs in urban areas, but also because urban dwellers invest most of their time and money to 
acquire skills, good health and thus developing their human capital endowments and higher income 
(Udo-Aka, 1975 and Epo et al. 2010). The number of younger children aged between 0-4 years is 
negatively related to household income. This is however probable as their presence may reduce the 
likelihood of employment and/or participation in terms of hours worked in the private sector and 
further affects household income negatively. This observation is supported by Manda (1997) who 
found a negative and significant relationship between the presence of younger children in a household 
and the decision to enter employment. It also corroborates with Zamo-Akono (2007) who with 
Cameroon data observed that the presence of children reduces the hours of work for women in 
informal activities, but only pertinent beyond a given threshold (five children) in the formal private 
sector. It is also important to highlight that the presence of younger children increases the reservation 
wage
11
 of especially married women, whereas their participation in labour activities can complement 
household income.  
The number of married household heads captured as cluster means correlates negatively and 
significantly with household income. This is possible as being married as opposed to being single 
reduces women’s chances of employment in the private and informal sectors and hence income. This 
observation runs contrary to Brown (1980) who found that being currently married enhances income. 
Access to microcredit is positively and significantly correlated with household income. Microcredit 
access permits households to finance consumption and also to undertake micro-investment endeavours 
that are welfare and income enhancing (Khandker, 2003; Hao, 2005; and Sikod and Ndamsa, 2011).   
 
5.2.2. Correlates of Private Sector Household Income: Subsamples 
Table 4 hosts instrumental variable estimates of the structural parameters of household per capita 
monthly income by private employment sectors in Cameroon. For the formal-private and informal 
employment sectors, the effect of employment vulnerability on household per capita monthly income 
is negative and significant. This finding is consistent with the full sample.  
Worthy of note is that workers in the informal sector suffer less the adverse effects of vulnerability on 
income than their formal sector counterparts (Table 4 columns 1 and 2). This is indication that 
informal sector operators receive some relative pecuniary compensation for their adverse working 
conditions, though not enough to translate into gains
12
. This may be because employers in the formal 
segment where labour supply far outstrips demand, compared to the informal employment sector 
where entry is almost free, are reluctant to pay workers more for adverse working conditions. This 
way, informal sector operators are more inclined, compared to those in formal employment, to 
motivate their employees to take-up tasks that do not support entirely their fundamental rights as 
workers. The assumption that average gains may compensate for a certain level of vulnerability is 
therefore only relatively confirmed in the informal sector. 
For the farm and nonfarm-private employment sectors (Table 4 columns 3 and 4), the effects of 
employment vulnerability on household per capita monthly income are also negative and significant as 
in the full sample. However, there is evidence that the effects of employment vulnerability on 
household income almost levels-up for these subsamples. This result implies that vulnerable workers 
in the farm and nonfarm sectors are exposed in the same way to losses in income due to employment 
vulnerability.  
                                                             
11 The reservation wage is the minimum wage at which a person is willing to enter employment. 
12 This is to say that though informal workers receive some relative pecuniary compensations, their adverse 
working conditions do not still relate positively with their incomes. 
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The other correlates (for instance, labour experience and its square, years of education, gender type, 
microcredit access, seniority in the enterprise, number of younger children in the household, married 
household heads, male and urban residency) drive through the same message in the informal, farm and 
nonfarm employment sectors as in the full sample. Most striking, in the formal-private employment 
sector, being married relates positively and significantly to household income. This perhaps is not a 
call for the unmarried in this sector to rush for it, but rather a signal for greater determination and 
dedication at work for all those on the path to marriage. Cluster level access to microcredit which is an 
important input in the income function of informal sector workers is negative and not significant in the 
formal-private sector.  
 
















Employment vulnerability intensity -0.028*** -0.026*** - 0.027*** -0.028* -0.026*** 
  (-6.03) (-6.32) (-4.86) (-2.02) (-4.42) 
Labour experience -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.048*** -0.022*** 
  (-8.63) (-9.74) (-5.48) (-5.89) (-7.72) 
Labour experience squared 0.0002*** 0.00022*** 0.00019*** 0.0007*** 0.00024*** 
  (8.28) (9.29) (6.21) (5.46) (6.05) 
Years of education 0.010** 0.009*** 0.013** 0.009 0.007 
  (2.26) (2.38) (2.57) (0.70) (1.25) 
Seniority in the enterprise 0.184*** 0.128*** 0.136*** 0.418*** 0.289*** 
  (5.65) (4.34) (3.36) (5.03) (7.51) 
Access to microcredit (cluster level) 0.402*** 0.438*** 0.413*** - 0.124 0.251*** 
  (5.87) (7.36) (5.13) (-0.63) (3.04) 
Number of younger children (cluster 
level) 
-0.103*** -0.097*** -0.084*** -0.212*** -0.150*** 
  (-20.40) (-22.4) (-15.54) (-11.56) (-19.7) 
Number of married household heads 
(cluster level) 
-0.235*** -0.274*** -0.239*** 0.191** -0.117*** 
  (-6.38) (-8.35) (-5.26) (1.97) (-2.80) 
Gender of household head  
(male = 1) 
-0.121*** -0.117*** -0.156*** - 0.041 -0.060** 
  (-5.73) (-6.42) (-6.32) (-0.56) (-2.31) 
Location of household head  
(urban = 1) 
0.272*** 0.282*** 0.110*** 0.156* 0.227*** 
  (8.31) (9.87) (2.34) (1.76) (6.00) 
Predicted vulnerability residual 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.026* 0.022*** 
  (6.01) (5.46) (3.84) (1.88) (3.83) 
constant 12.776*** 12.556*** 12.467*** 13.244*** 12.689*** 
  (32.50) (30.64) (22.75) (9.42) (21.8) 
Fisher Test-statistic (df;p-value) 586.10 (11,  
9207; 0.0000) 
413.16 (11,  
8253; 0.0000) 
110.76 (11,  
4205; 0.0000) 
67.93(11,   942; 
0.0000) 
241.71 (11,  
4809; 0.0000) 
Adj R-squared 0.4111 0.3543 0.2226 0.4358 0.3546 
Number of observations 9219 8265 4217 954 5002 
Source: Computed by author using ECAM III 
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Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses, except otherwise specified 
 
Worth mentioning is the observation that the number of younger children has a negative effect on 
household income in the formal and nonfarm-private sectors significantly in excess of that in the 
informal and farm sectors respectively. A possible, perhaps obvious, reason may be that workers in 
informal and farming activities find it relatively easier to cope with their labour market activities and 
younger children, thus mitigating the effect of the latter on market income. This is evident given the 
relative work flexibility with own-account businesses and farming activities compared to the formal-
private activities where work is more tight and regulated. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
This paper attempted to link up employment vulnerability and private sector household income 
empirically and further checked this linkage across private employment sectors in Cameroon. The 
paper employed the OLS approach and subsequently the IV approach to purge the structural parameter 
estimates of potential endogeneity problem. 
 
Econometric results showed that the effect of employment vulnerability on private sector income is 
generally negative. Importantly, we found that informal as opposed to formal employment sector, 
receive some relative pecuniary compensation for their adverse working conditions, though not 
enough to translate into gains. Thus, the assumption that average gains may compensate for a certain 
level of vulnerability was therefore only relatively confirmed in the informal sector. We also found 
evidence of compensations for managerial and supervisory duties or rewarding responsibility at work. 
The years of education, cumulated labour market experience and access to microcredit proved to be 
important inputs in determining private sector income, more especially in the informal and farm 
sectors. It was equally found that the number of younger children aged between 0-4 years in a 
household adversely affects household income, especially in the formal and nonfarm private sectors. 
These findings suggest that: (1) improving working conditions among private workers would go a long 
way to complement their income, especially in the informal and farming sectors. Specialized 
institutions like regional delegations for labour and social security and employment and professional 
training can coordinate and re-organise regional employment in the private sector in Cameroon to 
offer the best protection against the common features of employment vulnerability. These institutions 
are able to create the necessary conditions so that workers and employment agencies can function 
smoothly; they can ensure that workers in the private sector are treated fairly and meaningfully in 
terms of employment contracts, working hours per week, remuneration status and are affiliated to a 
social security network (example NSIF). Essentially, civil society organisations, trade unions and 
employers can improve their own efforts to reduce vulnerable employment. Trade union strategies for 
increasing membership amongst vulnerable workers, assessing the current availability of employment 
advice provision, and considering how good employers can better share practice and promote change 
with and amongst others are to be encouraged.  
 
 (2) More sector-specific targets or conventions to improve working conditions should be encouraged. 
Conventions like that signed in 2006 between the Cameroon government and the ILO to improve 
working conditions of private security agents, though not effective, is a good initiative that should be 
extended to other private sub-sectors, especially farm and informal. All these institutional efforts to 
improve working conditions among private sector workers would have a significant indirect effect on 
their private sector income. Institutions and conventions that militate to improve working conditions of 
workers in Cameroon are encouraged to scale-up their outreach to large numbers of vulnerable 
workers in informal and farming activities.  
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(3) Given the importance of education, training and regional institutions in curbing employment 
vulnerability, institutions like the National Employment Fund (NEF) should expand their activities - 
training of jobseekers, orientation of jobseekers, jobs prospects and provision of self employment - by 
opening other regional centres; as with the recent case of Bamenda. Each region in Cameroon should 
have a NEF to enhance the fight against employment vulnerability and thus, income. Equally, newly 
opened development centres like the National Civic Service for Participation in Development 
(NCSPD), set up during the first half of 2011, can also ensure participation of youths and vulnerable 
social groups in development.   
 
(4) However, improve credit access and education programmes for private sector workers would 
greatly complement their income, more especially for those in informal and farming sectors.  Struggles 
to reduce employment vulnerability should be accompanied by agricultural training programmes to 
enhance agricultural productivity in the farming sectors and reduce poverty therein. This way, region-
based agricultural development programmes like the South-West Development Authority (SOWEDA) 
in the South Western region and the North-West Development Authority (MIDENO) in the Northwest 
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Appendix 1: Density of Institutions per Region 
Adamawa Centre East Far 
North 
Littoral  North North 
West 
West South South 
West 
17 51 23 43 30 17 33 36 26 29 
 
Appendix 2: Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) of employment vulnerability  
To construct the employment vulnerability indicator, we employ the MCA as developed by Asselin 
(2002) and used by Ki et al. (2005) and Kamgnia Dia et al. (2008). 
Table A1 presents the explained inertia by the factor axes. From Table A1, it follows that the first 
factor axis that represents almost 29% of total inertia (quantity of information)
13
 is the one that 
describes better employment quality of workers.  
 
Table A1: Explained Inertia by the Factor Axis 
  Principal Inertia Percentage Cumulated percentage 
Factorial axis 1 0.57 28.5 28.5 
Factorial axis 2 0.23 11.3 39.8 
Total inertia 2.00 
  
Source: Constructed by author 
Table A2 hosts the initial indicator variables/categories used for the construction of employment 
vulnerability (column 1). The scores of the initial indicators coded in 0 /1 obtained with the MCA and 
the contributions of the various categories are presented in Table A2. This table host the initial scores 
on the first axis as well as the squared correlations or squared cosines which represent the quality of 
representation of each initial indicator.  















Employment contract     6.43 
  
Open-ended (written)  2.147 0.292 4.59 1,302 11.43 
                                                             
13 Note that the adjusted inertia approach, proposed by Benzecri (1979), to measure the quantity of information 
brought by an axis can only be used for an axis,  , with principal inertia (eigenvalue)   
 
    (Nenadic and 
Greenacre, 2007 – p.7). 
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Fixed term (written) 1.223 0.047 0.79 749 6.58 
Verbal agreement -0.104 0.009 0.13 1,024 8.99 
No contract -0.346 0.249 0.92 8,316 73.01 
Payslip   15.77 
  
Possess a payslip  2.573 0.907 12.75 2,752 24.16 
No payslip  -0.619 0.907 3.02 8,639 75.84 
Social security   15.36 
  
Affiliated to NSIF  2.653 0.881 12.60 2,548 22.37 
Not affiliated to NSIF -0.584 0.881 2.76 8,843 77.63 
Job satisfaction    7.36 
  
Training matches job  1.216 0.425 4.86 4,503 39.53 
Training does not 
match  job 
-0.615 0.425 2.50 6,888 60.47 
Under-employment   1.18 
  
Less hours fixed by 
employer 
1.226 0.012 0.26 224 1.97 
Indifferent 0.102 0.034 0.13 9,607 84.34 
Less hours due to 
economic situation 
-0.708 0.007 0.13 305 2.68 
Less hours due to 
health problems and 
domestic work 
-0.779 0.044 0.66 1,255 11.02 
Remuneration   14.98 
  
Fixed salary 1.697 0.336 4.86 2,378 20.88 
Daily/hourly pay 3.115 0.406 6.57 1,080 9.48 
Indifferent -0.173 0.001 0.00 157 1.38 
Piece rate -0.290 0.008 0.13 319 2.80 
Commissions/benefits -0.677 0.678 3.29 7,324 64.30 
In-kind and no 
payment 
-0.606 0.007 0.13 133 1.17 
Labour status   8.8 
  
Permanent regular 0.066 0.004 0.13 7,116 62.47 
Permanent seasonal 2.967 0.389 6.30 1,106 9.71 
Indifferent -0.774 0.155 1.84 2,318 20.35 
Temporary 
undefined/defined 
-0.212 0.021 0.53 851 7.47 




2.834 0.828 12.22 2,171 19.06 
Do not Receive 
housing allowance 
-0.513 0.828 2.23 9,22 80.94 
Paid leaves   15.31 
  
Perceive paid leaves  2.697 0.891 12.75 2,469 21.68 
Do not perceive paid -0.580 0. 891 2.56 8,922 78.32 
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Union membership   0.26 
  
Member of a trade 
union/association  
0.194 0.019 0.13 5,351 46.98 
Not a member of a 
trade 
union/association 
-0.169 0.019 0.13 6,04 53.02 
Source: Constructed by author with help of STATA 10 using CHCS III 
We normalise the indicator predicted from the first axis using:  
                                     
14                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 The normalised indicator     classifies workers in terms of increasing employment vulnerability, with 
values ranging from 0 to 1. 
 
                                                             
14 Note that      and      simply mean absolute maximum and minimum respectively. 
